David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):499-26 (1993)
It is a commonplace of philosophy that the notion of free will is a hard nut to crack. A simple, compelling argument can be made to show that behavior for which an agent is morally responsible cannot be the outcome of prior determining causal factors.1 Yet the smug satisfaction with which we incompatibilists are prone to trot out this argument has a tendency to turn to embarrassment when we're asked to explain just how it is that morally responsible action might obtain under the assumption of indeterminism. Despair over the prospect of giving a satisfactory answer to this question has led some contemporary philosophers to a position rarely, if ever, held in the history of philosophy: free, responsible action is an incoherent concept.2
|Keywords||Action Epistemology Free Will Indeterminism Moral|
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Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). The Problem of Enhanced Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.
Noel Hendrickson (2002). Against an Agent-Causal Theory of Action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):41-58.
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