Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will

New York, US: Oxford University Press USA (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This provocative book refurbishes the traditional account of freedom of will as reasons-guided "agent" causation, situating its account within a general metaphysics. O'Connor's discussion of the general concept of causation and of ontological reductionism v. emergence will specially interest metaphysicians and philosophers of mind.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Free will.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Libertarianism, luck, and action explanation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
Reasons explanations and pure agency.Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.
Agent-Causal Theories.Timothy O'Connor - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 309-328.
Active control, agent-causation and free action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
Agent Causation.Dale Arthur Tuggy - 2000 - Dissertation, Brown University
Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O’Connor’s Persons and Causes.John Bishop - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243.
Agent causation before and after the ontological turn.Daniel von Wachter - 2003 - In Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öbvhpt.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Objective Probabilities of Free Choice.Leigh C. Vicens - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):125-135.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
413 (#45,464)

6 months
35 (#96,513)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Timothy O'Connor
Indiana University, Bloomington

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references