Review of William Rowe, Can God Be Free? [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (4) (2005)
Consider the idea of God in classical philosophical theology. God is a personal being perfect in every way: absolutely independent of everything, such that nothing exists apart from God's willing it to be so; unlimited in power and knowledge; perfectly blissful, lacking in nothing needed or desired; morally perfect. If such a being were to create, on what basis would He choose? Let us assume (as perfect being theologians generally do) that there is an objective, degreed property of intrinsic goodness, such that every possible object is intrinsically good to some degree. We need not assume that this property is 'well ordered' in the sense that every object is comparable to every other, only that it is 'partially ordered' in the sense that every object belongs to one or another well ordered set of objects and has less goodness than God Himself. We thus replace the image of a linear 'great chain of being' with that of a branching structure whose branches reconnect only at their limit, which is God. And let us further suppose that whole systems of objects and their total histories -- possible worlds -- are likewise partially ordered by their intrinsic goodness. Now, if one or more of these creative options on each of the branches are of maximal overall value, is it inevitable that He would choose one of those? It seems passing strange that God would opt for less than the best when creating the best involves no cost at all. Yet supposing the choice of the best is inevitable for a perfect Creator seems at odds with the common assumption that God is perfectly free in choosing what He will. Perhaps, though, there is no set of one or more best creative choices. For every option, there is a better, with no finite upper bound on the ranked series. Here, matters are more puzzling. It appears that no matter which option God might choose, He must do so in the knowledge that there are options of arbitrarily greater value. It seems an odd constraint for a perfect being to have to live with..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Klaas J. Kraay (2007). Divine Unsurpassability. Philosophia 35 (3-4):293-300.
Richard Gale (1998). R. M. Adams's Theodicy of Grace. Philo 1 (1):36-44.
William Rowe (2002). Can God Be Free? Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):405-424.
James R. Beebe, Logical Problem of Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Michael Bergmann & J. A. Cover (2006). Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):381-408.
Robert T. Lehe (1986). God's Perfection and Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):319-323.
William J. Wainwright (2005). Rowe on God's Freedom and God's Grace. Philo 8 (1):12-22.
William Hasker (2005). Can God Be Free?: Rowe's Dilemma for Theology. Religious Studies 41 (4):453-462.
Norman Kretzmann (1985). Absolute Simplicity. Faith and Philosophy 2 (4):353-382.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #123,271 of 1,696,589 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,974 of 1,696,589 )
How can I increase my downloads?