Simplicity and Creation

Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):405-412 (1999)
Abstract
According to many philosophical theologians, God is metaphysically simple: there is no real distinction among His attributes or even between attribute and existence itself. Here, I consider only one argument against the simplicity thesis. Its proponents claim that simplicity is incompatible with God’s having created another world, since simplicity entails that God is unchanging across possible worlds. For, they argue, different acts of creation involve different willings, which are distinct intrinsic states. I show that this is mistaken, by sketching an adequate account of reasons-guided activity that does not require distinct intrinsic states of willing corresponding to each possible act of creation
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/faithphil199916339
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,046
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Joseph Stenberg (2014). Divine Properties, Parts, and Parity. International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75 (5):388-405.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-12-02

Total downloads

11 ( #326,420 of 1,934,456 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #195,826 of 1,934,456 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.