Online research in philosophy

The derivation of a category of 'environmental rights' (as argued in this journal by Margaret DeMerieux) from certain cases heard in the European Court of Human Rights is examined. Opposing the majority judicial opinion of that court, there is emerging a dissenting view which is reluctant to extend a rights perspective to those nuisances which can, in theory, be avoided by relocation of the family home. This critique is then extended to v in which the claimant used the Human Rights Act 1998 (as well as common law) to secure damages for an environmental threat (flooding) to his home. It is further argued that any 'rights' dimension currently attached to environmental intrusion on private life will give way to policy imperatives once the effects of climate change come to be recognized.

Freedom of religious expression is to many a fundamental element of their identity. Yet the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic headscarf issue does not refer to autonomy and identity rights of the individual women claimants. The case law focuses on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides a legal human right to freedom of religious expression. The way that provision is interpreted is critically contrasted here with the right to personal autonomy and identity now developed by that court in interpreting Article 8 which contains a right to respect one’s private life.

The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to cases of religiously offensive expression is inconsistent and unsatisfactory. A critical analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on blasphemy, religious insult and religious hatred identifies three problems with its approach in this field. These are: the embellishment and over-emphasis of freedom of religion, the use of the margin of appreciation and the devaluing of some forms of offensive speech. Nevertheless, it is possible to defend a more coherent approach to the limitation of freedom of expression under the European Convention of Human Rights, designed to protect religious liberty in a narrower category of cases.

This paper proposes a comparative analysis of some rulings of the US Supreme Court and of the European Court of Human Rights. Reviewing cases related to international legal problems or using comparative legal reasoning, the paper suggests that the difference of attitudes between the two courts in human rights cases is embedded in the classical opposition between men and citizen.

This article explores the evolution of the European Convention [of Human Rights]applicability in private law through the developmentof the conceptof positive obligationson state parties arising under the Convention. The article exploresthe caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights primarily through the caseof Pla and Puncernau v Andorra, looking at the law of interpretation and the regulation of private transactions through the principles of "horizontal effect" and the Convention as a "living instrument", concluding with observations concerning the legitimacy of the European Court's position on this issue.

The European Convention on Human Rights has traditionally been regarded as a civil and political rights instrument. Recently, a new method of interpretation, which came to be known also as the integrated approach to human rights, is reflected in decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. This approach is based on the idea that the enjoyment of civil and political rights is rendered meaningless if social rights are neglected and that social entitlements are as intrinsically valuable as the interests underlying civil and political rights. The present piece analyses a recent judgment of the Court, Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, which is likely to be regarded as a paradigm example of the integrated approach, and explores its implications for the interpretation of the ECHR. It argues that the Court has to address the social rights implications of the Convention under a coherent theory of adjudication according to principles that lie behind the ECHR.

This case note discusses the case of Baczkowski v. Poland in the European Court of Human Rights. The Court ruled that, where an elected mayor makes comments disapproving of homosexuality, and officials subsequently ban a Gay Pride march, then courts may be able to infer that the ban was discriminatory under Article 14 ECHR.

This Handbook deals with the right to life, as guaranteed by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights ("the Court") under that article. In summarising the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (and where relevant, of the European Commission on Human Rights, abolished by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention) on Article 2, reference is however often also made to more general issues, to other rights in the Convention, and to issues outside the Convention (such as other European or United Nations standards), as reflected in that case-law. This handbook is aimed, in particular, at judges and other legal professionals such as prosecutors and practising lawyers. These need to understand the Convention and the case-law of the Court, in particular when the Convention is formally part of their domestic legal systems - as is the case in most of the member States of the Council of Europe. Indeed, in law, the Convention in many European countries overrides ordinary domestic law. It is therefore crucial for these legal practitioners to be aware of the detailed requirements of the Convention. More specifically, it follows from the supremacy of the Convention that the interpretation of the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights should also be followed by the national courts in these countries. The Court's judgments are not merely advisory or relevant to the respondent State in a given case only. Rather, in Council of Europe member States in which domestic law or jurisprudence proclaims the supremacy of international law in general, and/or of international human rights law or the Convention in particular, the domestic courts must follow the European Court of Human Rights' interpretations of the Convention in their own jurisprudence. It is hoped that this handbook, together with the other handbooks already issued, will help them do so.