Online research in philosophy

Marrying the map -- Headwaters -- Compatriots -- Saint Beech -- After olive picking -- Hunter in the sky -- Gifts of prophecy -- The broken sheepfold -- Mowing -- Dust of snow -- Inheriting Mount Tom -- Forever wild again -- Into the wind -- Maggie Brook.

In reply to the problem of evil, some suggest that God created an infinite number of universes – for example, that God created every universe that contains more good than evil. I offer two objections to these multiverse theodicies. First, I argue that, for any number of universes God creates, he could have created more, because he could have created duplicates of universes. Next, I argue that multiverse theodicies can’t adequately account for why God would create universes with pointless suffering, and hence they don’t solve the problem of evil.

Anticipating Mikhail Bakhtin’s appreciation for the unfinalizability of Fedor Dostoevskij’s universe, prominent Protestant theologian Karl Barth celebrates the Russian novelist’s presentation of “the impenetrable ambiguity of human life” characteristic of both the ending of Dostoevsky’s novels and Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. Barth’s unique reading of The Brothers Karamazov not only demonstrates the barrenness of the “theocratic dream” but also complements Bakhtin’s discussion of polyphony with an explicitly theological dimension by focusing on the dialogue between Creator and the created. Dostoevsky’s prophetic voice provides Barth with a poetic expression of the divine command that highlights the ethical dimension inherent in every theological choice.

This essay critically evaluates the theodicies of John Hick, Richard Swinburne and process theism regarding animal suffering and evils. Their positions on animals are found to be flawed and/or inadequate because they cannot explain the mass suffering and unnecessary deaths to animals throughout time. I also offer a positive contribution. That is, God’s putative love for all humans and animals does not entail that he loves every single human and animal. It is very possible that God treats humans and animals similarly in regard to evils. This theory partly explains human tragedies such as the Holocaust and much unnecessary animal and human suffering.

Some of the most characteristic features of the Soviet totalitarian system were foreseen by Dostoevsky through his knowledge of the radical Russian intelligentsia of his day.

What do theodicies do? This paper argues that we can evaluate and respond to theodicies more effectively if we ask, as pragmatists, what problems we are trying to solve, whether we solve them effectively, and whether these are the problems we should be addressing. Some maintain that, beyond defending religious beliefs, theodicies also address deep emotional needs. I argue that we would do better to abandon theodicies of hidden meaning, acknowledge honestly that bad things happen, and seek comfort and meaning by bringing about whatever good is possible in the situation.

In this paper I further the discussion on the adequacy of free will theodicies initiated by Joel Tierno. Tierno’s principal claim is that free will theodicies fail to account for the wide distribution of moral evil. I attempt to show that, even if Tierno need not rely on a compatibilist conception of free will in order to substantiate the aforementioned claim, there remains good reason to think that free will theodicies are not explanatorily inadequate in the way suggested by Tierno.

I wish to show how the existence and order of nature may function as a witness to God’s existence and goodness. Although “witness” is a theological term, the argument is a philosophical one.

In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies.