The metaphysics of emergence

Noûs 39 (4):658-678 (2005)
Abstract
The objective probability of every physical event is fixed by prior physical events and laws alone. (This thesis is sometimes expressed in terms of explanation: In tracing the causal history of any physical event, one need not advert to any non-physical events or laws. To the extent that there is any explanation available for a physical event, there is a complete explanation available couched entirely in physical vocabulary. We prefer the probability formulation, as it should be acceptable to any physicalist, though some reject the explanation formulation.) (3) Causal Exclusion
Keywords Causation  Emergence  Mental  Metaphysics  Properties
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DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00543.x
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
Paul W. Humphreys (1997). How Properties Emerge. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17.

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Citations of this work BETA
Richard Corry (2013). Emerging From the Causal Drain. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.

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