Thomas Reid on free agency

Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (4):605-622 (1994)
Reid takes it to be part of our commonsense view of ourselves that "we" -- "qua" enduring substances, not merely "qua" subjects of efficacious mental states -- are often the immediate causes of our own volitions. Only if this conviction is veridical, Reid thinks, may we be properly held to be responsible for our actions (indeed, may we truly be said to "act" at all). This paper offers an interpretation of Reid's account of such agency (taking account of Rowe's recent commentary), with particular attention to the issue of the causation of and responsibility for an agent's "causing" of his volition.
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DOI 10.1353/hph.1994.0075
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Esther Engels Kroeker (2015). Thomas Reid Today. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (2):95-114.
Hagit Benbaji (2003). Reid on Causation and Action. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 1 (1):1-19.

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