David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Topics 24 (2):143-58 (1996)
I Introduction The question of this paper is, what would it be to act with freedom of the will? What kind of control is inchoately in view when we speak, pretheoretically, of being ‘self- determining’ beings, of ‘freely making choices in view of consciously considered reasons’ (pro and con) - of its being ‘up to us’ how we shall act? My question here is not whether we have (or have any reason to think we have) such freedom, or what is the most robust account of our freedom compatible with late twentieth-century science. Many contemporary philosophers are all too ready to settle for a deflationary account of freedom and declare victory, with some brief remarks reminding us that we were created a little lower than the angels. I am not so sanguine about the ability of such accounts to leave reasonably intact our judgments about human autonomy, dignity, and responsibility. But, as I’ve said, that’s not my concern here. Instead, I want to revisit the question of what exactly ‘self-determination’, on our ordinary conception, comes to
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Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2005). Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
Alfred R. Mele (1999). Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Stefanie Grüne (2003). Sartre on Mistaken Sincerity. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):145–160.
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