David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):61-87 (1998)
What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons.
|Keywords||normativity autonomy metaethics interpersonal reasons rationality publicity Korsgaard|
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1981). Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980. Cambridge University Press.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Stefano Bertea (2013). Constitutivism and Normativity: A Qualified Defence. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):81-95.
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