Hume, the BAD Paradox, and Value Realism

Philo 4 (2):109-122 (2001)
A recent slew of arguments, if sound, would demonstrate that realism about value involves a kind of paradox-I call it the BAD paradox.More precisely, they show that if there are genuine propositions about the good, then one could maintain harmony between one’s desires and one’s beliefs about the good only on pain of violating fundamental principles of decision theory. I show. however, the BAD paradox turns out to be a version of Newcomb’s problem, and that the cognitivist about value can avoid the paradox by embracing casual decision theory
Keywords desire as belief paradox
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DOI 10.5840/philo20014210
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Steven Daskal (2010). Absolute Value as Belief. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):221 - 229.

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