David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Truth is the aim of inquiry. Nevertheless, some falsehoods seem to realize this aim better than others. Some truths better realize the aim than other truths. And perhaps even some falsehoods realize the aim better than some truths do. The dichotomy of the class of propositions into truths and falsehoods should thus be supplemented with a more fine-grained ordering — one which classifies propositions according to their closeness to the truth, their degree of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. The logical problem of truthlikeness is to give an adequate account of the concept and to explore its logical properties. Of course, the logical problem intersects with problems in both epistemology and value theory.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Carlotta Piscopo & Mauro Birattari (2010). A Critique of the Constitutive Role of Truthlikeness in the Similarity Approach. Erkenntnis 72 (3):379 - 386.
Jesus P. Zamora Bonilla (2000). Truthlikeness, Rationality And Scientific Method. Synthese 122 (3):321-335.
Jesus P. Zamora Bonilla (2000). Truthlikeness, Rationality and Scientific Method. Synthese 122 (3):321-335.
Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla (1992). Truthlikeness Without Truth: A Methodological Approach. Synthese 93 (3):343 - 372.
Graham Oddie (1986). The Poverty of the Popperian Program for Truthlikeness. Philosophy of Science 53 (2):163-178.
Eric Barnes (1991). Beyond Verisimilitude: A Linguistically Invariant Basis for Scientific Progress. Synthese 88 (3):309 - 339.
Geoffrey Gorham (1995). The Concept of Truth in Feminist Sciences. Hypatia 10 (3):99 - 116.
Giorgio Volpe (1995). A Semantic Approach to Comparative Verisimilitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):563-581.
I. A. Kieseppä (1996). On the Aim of the Theory of Verisimilitude. Synthese 107 (3):421 - 438.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads62 ( #19,606 of 1,008,173 )
Recent downloads (6 months)18 ( #5,639 of 1,008,173 )
How can I increase my downloads?