Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 53 (2):163-178 (1986)
|Abstract||The importance for realism of the concept of truthlikeness was first stressed by Popper. Popper himself not only mapped out a program for defining truthlikeness (in terms of falsity content and truth content) but produced the first definitions within this program. These were shown to be inadequate. But the program lingered on, and the most recent attempt to revive it is that of Newton-Smith. His attempt is a failure, not because of some minor defect or technical flaw in his particular account but rather because the program incorporates a fundamental flaw. However, realists need not despair. There already exists an entirely different program not subject to these criticisms|
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