David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy 75 (4):517-537 (2000)
Freedom of belief is one of the entrenched values in modern society. Interpreted as the right not to be coerced into believing something, it is surely correct. But most people take it to mean that there is a right to false belief, a right to be wrong. People think that freedom of thought is a good thing, and this must include the freedom to make mistakes. It is also often thought that making mistakes is a life-enhancing and essential part of personal development. I argue that these ideas are false. Beginning with an examination of the basic good of truth, and making comparisons with other goods like health and friendship, I argue that there is a duty to believe only the truth, which thus logically excludes the right also to believe falsehood. I distinguish between the strict wrongness of false belief and the fact that, because of our epistemic limitations, we are not always to be blamed for our false beliefs. Even in the case of those beliefs which are involuntary, there is no right to have them if they are false, even though we are not to be blamed for having them. The right to be wrong, I conclude, is a modern myth.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paul Bloom (2000). Two Reasons to Abandon the False Belief Task as a Test of Theory of Mind. Cognition 77 (1):25-31.
Christopher Steinsvold (2010). Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253.
David Braddon-Mitchell (2006). Believing Falsely Makes It So. Mind 115 (460):833-866.
Michael J. Shaffer (2006). The Publicity of Belief, Epistemic Wrongs and Moral Wrongs. Social Epistemology 20 (1):41 – 54.
Richard Holton (2001). What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.
Simon J. Evnine (2001). Learning From One's Mistakes: Epistemic Modesty and the Nature of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):157–177.
Andrew Huddleston (2012). Naughty Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #85,234 of 1,100,076 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #304,128 of 1,100,076 )
How can I increase my downloads?