Keynes's weight of argument and Popper's paradox of ideal evidence

Philosophy of Science 59 (1):44-52 (1992)
Popper's paradox of ideal evidence has long been viewed as a telling criticism of Keynes's logical theory of probability and its associated concept of the weight of argument. This paper shows that a simple addition to Keynes's definitions of irrelevance enables his theory to elude the paradox with ease. The modified definition draws on ideas already present in Keynes's Treatise on Probability (1973). As a consequence, relevant evidence and the weight of argument may increase, even when new evidence leaves the probability unaltered
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DOI 10.1086/289653
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