Searle, Leibniz and 'the first person': A note on the epilogue of intentionality
In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter (1994)
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| Keywords | Grammar Intentionality Language Leibniz Searle, J | |||||||||
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David M. Armstrong (1991). Intentionality, Perception, and Causality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Gregory Mcculloch (1984). Cause in Perception: A Note on Searle's Intentionality. Analysis 44 (October):203-205.
Christopher A. Fields (1984). Double on Searle's Chinese Room. Nature and System 6 (March):51-54.
Jack J. Vromen (2003). Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.
Alan Malachowski (1988). Searle on First Person Meaning and Indeterminacy. Theoria 54 (1):25-30.
G. Bar-Elli (1994). Intentionality and Belief de Re: A Critical Study of Searle's Representative Internalism. Erkenntnis 41 (1):65-85.
Dale Jacquette (1989). Searle's Intentionality Thesis. Synthese 80 (August):267-75.
Timothy Weiss (1990). Closing the Chinese Room. Ratio 3 (2):165-81.
Philip Cam (1990). Searle on Strong AI. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):103-8.
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