Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1015-1027 (1999)
|Abstract||There is a general consensus that Quine's assault on analyticity and verificationism in `Two Dogma of Empiricism' has been successful and that Carnap's philosophical position has been vanquished. This paper so characterises Carnap's position that it escapes Quine's criticisms. It shows that the disagreement is not a first order dispute about analyticity or verificationism, but rather a deeper dispute about philosophical method|
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