Carnap and two dogmas of empiricism

Abstract There is a general consensus that Quine's assault on analyticity and verificationism in `Two Dogma of Empiricism' has been successful and that Carnap's philosophical position has been vanquished. This paper so characterises Carnap's position that it escapes Quine's criticisms. It shows that the disagreement is not a first order dispute about analyticity or verificationism, but rather a deeper dispute about philosophical method
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    Scott Soames (2009). Ontology, Analyticity, and Meaning : The Quine-Carnap Dispute. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
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