Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):888-889 (2004)
|Abstract||Strong between- and within-animal differences during spatial activities lead us to claim that a given animal is directly sensitive to a given substructure of the global array. This vicarious subset is not cut out by the senses but by redundancies emerging from physical properties. We argue that the subset is not a single ambient array, or a combination of single ambient arrays, but a complex holistic part of the global array.|
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