Some Problems of the Scientific-Philosophical Theory of Truth I. Recent Epistemological Subjectivism and the Problem of Truth

Russian Studies in Philosophy 21 (4):7-32 (1983)
The concept of truth is a fundamental category in the theory of knowledge and philosophy in general. Other philosophical categories presuppose the concept of truth as their content or as the goal of investigatory inquiry. Philosophy begins historically with rejection of any form of opinion in the name of truth and with the counterposing of what truly exists to the variety of appearance. Thus was born theoretical thought, for which in antiquity philosophy was a synonym
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DOI 10.2753/RSP1061-196721047
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