Probabilistic induction and Hume's problem: Reply to Lange

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):419–424 (2003)
Abstract
Marc Lange has criticized my assertion that relative to a Bayesian conception of inductive reasoning, Hume's argument for inductive scepticism cannot be run. I reply that the way in which Lange suggests one should run the Humean argument in a Bayesian framework ignores the fact that in Bayesian models of learning from experience, the domain of an agent's probability measure is exogenously determined. I also show that Lange is incorrect to equate probability distributions which 'support inductive inferences' with probability distributions which assign probability to contingent propositions/events
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References found in this work BETA
Marc Lange (2002). Okasha on Inductive Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):226-232.
Samir Okasha (2001). What Did Hume Really Show About Induction? Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):307-327.
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