Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 55 (3):371-385 (2001)
|Abstract||Verificationism has often seemed attractive to philosophers because of its apparent abilityto deliver us from scepticism. However, I argue that purely epistemological considerationsprovide insufficient reason for embracing verificationism over realism. I distinguish twotypes of sceptical problem: those that stem from underdetermination by the actual data,and those that stem from underdetermination by all possible data. Verificationismevades problems of the second sort, but is powerless in the face of problems of the firstsort. But problems of the first sort are equally pressing. Furthermore, there is some reasonto think that the two types of problem have a common origin. Thus the desire to avoidscepticism provides insufficient reason for adopting verificationism.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Almeder (1979). Peirce on Meaning. Synthese 41 (1):1 - 24.
Charles E. Marks (1975). Verificationism, Scepticism, and the Private Language Argument. Philosophical Studies 28 (3):151-171.
George Schlesinger (1978). Verificationism and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):242 – 250.
Dennis W. Stampe (1986). Verificationism and a Causal Account of Meaning. Synthese 69 (October):107-37.
JC Beall (2000). Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
Dag Prawitz (1994). Quine and Verificationism. Inquiry 37 (4):487 – 494.
John Wright (1985). Realism, Verificationism and Underdetermination. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):503-529.
Roger Wertheimer (1993). Socratic Scepticism. Metaphilosophy 24 (4):344-62.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #85,964 of 732,212 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,863 of 732,212 )
How can I increase my downloads?