Logical empiricism, feminism, and Neurath's auxiliary motive

Hypatia 19 (1):48-72 (2004)
: Much feminist philosophy of science has been developed as a reaction against logical empiricism and the associated view that social factors play no role in good science. Recent accounts of the Vienna Circle that highlighted the ways in which some of its members attempted to combine their empiricism with emancipatory politics are used here as a basis on which to reassess the relationship between logical empiricism and feminism. The focus is chiefly on Otto Neurath.
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DOI 10.2979/HYP.2004.19.1.48
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References found in this work BETA
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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