Doxastic Logic of Demonstratives; Indexical and Reﬂexive Pronouns in Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||In this article I will develop the ﬁrst steps of a wholly general theory of how indexical and reﬂexive pronouns function in propositional attitude ascriptions. This will involve a theory of ascriptions of de se beliefs and de se utterances, which can probably be also generalized so as to apply to ascriptions of other attitudes. It will also involve a theory about the ascriptions of beliefs or other attitudes a person has at a time about what happens then (attitudes de praesente, as they are sometimes called) and the beliefs of a person concerning the one whom he is addressing (which I might call beliefs de recipiente) etc.. The most distinctive aspect of the theory will be that I will argue that many phenomena associated with such ascriptions that are nowadays most often viewed as pragmatic are semantic. I will use a system of symbolic logic to formalize such ascriptions. I will start from David Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives and generalize it into a logic I call Doxastic Logic of Demonstratives, DLD. Crucial to the semantics of the logic will be an exact deﬁnition of the adjustments of a character from one context to another|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Joel Smith (2006). Which Immunity to Error? Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.
Gert Jan Lokhorst (1988). Ontology, Semantics and Philosophy of Mind in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Formal Reconstruction. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 29 (1):35 - 75.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Against Essential Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
Diederik Olders & Peter Sas (2001). Lifting the Church-Ban on Quotational Analysis: The Translation Argument and the Use-Mention Distinction. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 32 (2):257-270.
Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
Dilip Ninan (2010). De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.
Tom Stoneham (1998). On Believing That I Am Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.
Heinrich Wansing (2006). Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and the Logic of Agency. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):201 - 227.
Kenneth A. Taylor (2003). Singular Beliefs and Their Ascriptions. In Reference and the Rational Mind. Csli Publications.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #131,771 of 739,325 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?