Individualism, subjectivity, and presence: A response to Taylor Carman
Inquiry 37 (3):331 – 337 (1994)
| Abstract | This is a reply to an article in the preceding issue. I show that Carman's attempt {Inquiry 37 [1994], pp. 203?23) to meet my critique of Dreyfus's interpretation of Heidegger is itself open to criticism on several important points. He imputes an ?anti?individualistic? attitude to Heidegger and denies that the concept of Dasein is in any sense the concept of a subject; but both these claims are refuted by appealing to express statements by Heidegger. Carman also denies that the concept of presence plays any significant role in Heidegger's early thought; and against this I show that it is centrally involved in several of the lecture series from the period of Being and Time. A number of other criticisms are taken up, among them those having to do with the concept of a clearing (Lichtung), the role of perception in Heidegger's account of Dasein, and the anonymous public kind of selfhood that Heidegger calls Das Man. In the case of this last, I argue that the case for regarding it as a necessary condition of the intelligibility of the world to us is extremely weak | |||||||||
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