Ciencia Y tecnología: Distinciones externas

Theoria 2 (2):323-344 (1987)
In this paper the role of values in scientific and technological processes of inquiry is discussed. It is argued that a distinction between science and technology cannot any longer be attempted on the basis of being based upon respectively different sets of values and aims. Furthermore, it is argued that usually these attempts have wrongly characterised science and technology in terms of a fixed and immutable set of aims, values and norms. This sort of characterisation has often been put forward not only for the purposes of such a distinction but as a general idea in philosophy of science. Some of the problems of such and approach are discussed, particularly by examining some recent ideas of Shapere and Laudan, concerning the processes of consensus shaping in the sciences. So, it is concluded that we have to reject the idea that both science and technology are based on a technical interest in knowledge, an idea that normally blurrs the significance of changes at their axiological level, as much as the conception that science and technology belong to completely different camps, which quite often takes their respective axiological levels as immutable
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DOI theoria198722/349
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