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The metaphysics of forces

Dialectica 64 (4):555-589 (2009)
Abstract
This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal rela- tions. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a species of causation.
Keywords forces  powers  causation  dispositions  mechanics  causality  metaphysics  vectors  Newton  direction
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    Citations of this work BETA
    David Yates (2013). The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):93-128.
    Dwayne Moore (2012). A Non-Reductive Model of Component Forces and Resultant Force. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):359-380.
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    Jessica Wilson (2007). Newtonian Forces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):173 - 205.
    E. J. Lowe (1992). The Problem of Psychophysical Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):263-76.
    John D. Norton (2003). Causation as Folk Science. Philosophers' Imprint 3 (4):1-22.
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