The Two Levels in Natural Law Thinking

Jurisprudence 1 (2):197-224 (2010)
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Abstract

Central parts of the natural law theories of Grotius and Pufendorf assume that persons by nature have individual realms of their own, violations of which constitute a wrong. This is the basis for their accounts of promises, ownership and reactions against wrongs. These accounts are significantly independent of any assumption that a superior being imposes obligations: rather, the individuals themselves create obligations by their own acts of will. The translator's introducton draws attention to the author's relation to Hägerström, and remarks briefly on related points in Ames, Köhler and Georges Davy

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Thomas Mautner
Australian National University

References found in this work

Pourquoi vaut la foi jurée.Georges Davy - 1917 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 24 (3):327 - 353.

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