Paraconsistency and Analyticity

Logic and Logical Philosophy 7 (1):91-99 (1999)
William Parry conceived in the early thirties a theory of entail-
ment, the theory of analytic implication, intended to give a formal expression to the idea that the content of the conclusion of a valid argument must be included in the content of its premises. This paper introduces a system of analytic, paraconsistent and quasi-classical propositional logic that does not validate the paradoxes of Parry’s analytic implication. The interpretation of the expressions of this logic will be given in terms of a four-valued semantics,and its proof theory will be provided by a system of signed semantic tableaux that incorporates the techniques developed to improve the efficiency of the tableaux method for many-valued logics.
1. Introduction.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.12775/LLP.1999.008
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,974
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (2014). A Computational Interpretation of Conceptivism. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (4):333-367.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

3 ( #462,758 of 1,725,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #348,700 of 1,725,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.