In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (2001)
|Abstract||Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Substance Thinking|
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