Buck-passing and the wrong kind of reasons

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300 (2004)
According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such reasons are of the wrong kind. This is what I set out to do, after illustrating the objection more thoroughly
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00353.x
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Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2).
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.

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