David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studia Logica 73 (2):219 - 240 (2003)
Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming.
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Mathematical Logic and Foundations Computational Linguistics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson (2011). AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
Similar books and articles
Isaac Levi (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Ross Poole (1992). Living with Reason. Inquiry 35 (2):199 – 217.
Pauline Kleingeld (1998). Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice. Noûs 47 (1):104-134.
Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
Gabriella Pigozzi, G. Boella, C. Costa Pereirdaa, A. Tettamanzi & and Leon van der Torre, Choosing Your Beliefs.
Giacomo Bonanno (2009). Rational Choice and Agm Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 173:1194-1203.
Lydia Mechtenberg (2004). The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):495 - 507.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #213,207 of 1,725,579 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #349,436 of 1,725,579 )
How can I increase my downloads?