David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 5 (October):129-44 (1975)
1) reductionism in psychology is not a single move regarding a single conceptual issue, but is rather a complex of concerns with a network of conceptually interrelated issues. 2) reductionistic moves tend to explicitly rely upon or implicitly presuppose the use of dispositional terms. 3) dispositional terms will not serve to effect reductionistic programs because they themselves require many of the features that those programs require excising. 4) if dispositionals are not themselves logically tied to intentionals, they at least bear a sufficient family resemblance to participate in logical problems similar to those of intentionals and modals. 5) if dispositionals and intentionals do not require the teleological frame from which they historically arose, then they at least require some alternative accounting, not an elimination
|Keywords||Disposition Intention Psychology Reductionism Science Social Sciences Carnap Hempel Ryle, G|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ned Block (ed.) (1980). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Jean Lachapelle (2000). Cultural Evolution, Reductionism in the Social Sciences, and Explanatory Pluralism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3):331-361.
John Bickle (1996). New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):57-78.
Alan Zaitchik (1981). Intentionalism and Physical Reductionism in Computational Psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):23-41.
John Bolender (1995). Is Multiple Realizability Compatible with Antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.
Robert C. Richardson (1999). Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: New Wave Reductionism. Philosopical Psychology 12 (3):297-307.
Andrew Lugg (1975). Putnam on Reductionism. Cognition 3 (3):289-293.
Maurice Kenneth Davy Schouten & Huibert Looren de Jong (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction. Blackwell Pub..
Anne Jaap Jacobson (2005). Is the Brain a Memory Box? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):271-278.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #116,137 of 1,696,562 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #343,026 of 1,696,562 )
How can I increase my downloads?