Fitting attitude analyses of value and the partiality challenge
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365 - 378 (2009)
| Abstract | According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such that it ought to be favoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour. All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge : there are circumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due to the personal relations in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing on the value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first philosophers to draw attention to the partiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and consider Ewing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirely satisfactory. I go on to develop an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing could have offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing actually did offer. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesAchille Varzi (2000). Topological Essentialism. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):217 - 236.
Mark Alfano (2009). A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3).
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007). Analysing Personal Value. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405 - 435.
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
Chris Heathwood (2008). Fitting Attitudes and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.
Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Value and Reasons to Favour. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford University Press.
K. Bykvist (2009). No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails. Mind 118 (469):1-30.
Michael J. Zimmerman (2010). Responsibility, Reaction, and Value. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):103-115.
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004). The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value. Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
M. J. Zimmerman (2011). Partiality and Intrinsic Value. Mind 120 (478):447-483.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-05-09Total downloads37 ( #31,927 of 549,090 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,090 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
