G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534 (2006)
Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400601079029
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Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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