G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534 (2006)
Abstract
Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Should We Pass the Buck? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:159-173.

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