David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):396-406 (1998)
In this paper I shall explore a novel alternative to these familiar views. In his recent book Sub ects of Ex erience, E. J. Lowe argues, as many others have done before, that you and I are not animals. It follows from this, he says, that we must be simple substances without parts. That may sound like Cartesian dualism. But Lowe is no Cartesian. He argues from premises that many present-day materialists accept. And he claims that our being mereologically simple is consistent with our having such paradigmatically physical properties as being six feet tall and weighing 160 pounds. You and I, he claims, are mereological atoms shaped like human beings
|Keywords||Animalism Atom Experience Human Metaphysics Lowe, E|
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References found in this work BETA
Peter M. Simons (1987/2000). Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
David Wiggins (1980). Sameness and Substance. Harvard University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press 135-164.
E. J. Lowe (1989). Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Andrew M. Bailey (2014). The Elimination Argument. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):475-482.
Andrew M. Bailey (2016). You Are An Animal. Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
David Liggins (2008). Nihilism Without Self-Contradiction. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):177-196.
E. J. Lowe (2000). In Defence of the Simplicity Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):105 – 112.
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