David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):396-406 (1998)
In this paper I shall explore a novel alternative to these familiar views. In his recent book Sub ects of Ex erience, E. J. Lowe argues, as many others have done before, that you and I are not animals. It follows from this, he says, that we must be simple substances without parts. That may sound like Cartesian dualism. But Lowe is no Cartesian. He argues from premises that many present-day materialists accept. And he claims that our being mereologically simple is consistent with our having such paradigmatically physical properties as being six feet tall and weighing 160 pounds. You and I, he claims, are mereological atoms shaped like human beings
|Keywords||Animalism Atom Experience Human Metaphysics Lowe, E|
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Citations of this work BETA
David Liggins (2008). Nihilism Without Self-Contradiction. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):177-196.
Andrew M. Bailey (2014). The Elimination Argument. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):475-482.
E. J. Lowe (2000). In Defence of the Simplicity Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):105 – 112.
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