Material coincidence and the indiscernibility problem

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):337-355 (2001)
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Abstract

It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological, and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with

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Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Two notions of being: Entity and essence.E. J. Lowe - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:23-48.
Getting priority straight.Louis deRosset - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73-97.

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References found in this work

Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
Personal identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by Richard Swinburne.

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