Material coincidence and the indiscernibility problem

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):337-355 (2001)
Abstract
It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological, and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with
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References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151 - 159.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151-159.

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Citations of this work BETA
Louis deRosset (2010). Getting Priority Straight. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73 - 97.
Louis deRosset (2011). What is the Grounding Problem? Philosophical Studies 156 (2):173-197.
Kit Fine (2008). Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):101-118.

View all 19 citations

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