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On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:39-56 (2015)
Abstract
Derek Parfit claims that we are not human beings. Rather, each of us is the part of a human being that thinks in the strictest sense. This is said to solve a number of difficult metaphysical problems. I argue that the view has metaphysical problems of its own, and is inconsistent with any psychological-continuity account of personal identity over time, including Parfit's ownAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head.Chad Carmichael - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):205-224.
The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning.Eric T. Olson - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):24-40.
Defending the substance view against its critics.Bruce P. Blackshaw - 2021 - The New Bioethics 28 (1):54-67.
References found in this work
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.
Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3):184-185.
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