Analysis 61 (269):38-44 (2001)
|Abstract||Sydney Shoemaker has argued that, because we can imagine a people who take themselves to survive a 'brain-state-transfer' procedure, cerebrum transplant, or the like, we ought to conclude that we could survive such a thing. I claim that the argument faces two objections, and can be defended only by depriving it any real interest|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Personal Identity Radiation Self Shoemaker, S|
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