Responsibility and the consequences of choice

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188 (2009)
Contemporary egalitarian theories of justice constrain the demands of equality by responsibility, and do not view as unjust inequalities that are traceable to individuals' choices. This paper argues that, in order to make non-arbitrary determinate judgements of responsibility, any theory of justice needs a principle of stakes , that is, an account of what consequences choices should have. The paper also argues that the principles of stakes seemingly presupposed by egalitarians are implausible, and that adopting alternative principles of stakes amounts to fleshing out the demands of responsibility rather than imposing limits on them.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00263.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hugh Lazenby (2014). Luck, Risk and the Market. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):667-680.

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