David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):510-538 (2010)
Abstract: The intent of this paper is to indicate a development in Sellars' writings which points in another direction than the interpretations offered by Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith. Brandom and McDowell have long claimed to preserve central insights of Sellars's theory of perception; however, they disagree over what exactly these insights are. A. D. Smith has launched a critique of Sellars in chapter 2 of his book The Problem of Perception which is so penetrating that it would tear Sellars' philosophy of perception apart if it were adequate. However, I try to show firstly that Brandom's and McDowell's interpretations are unsatisfying when Sellars' late writings are taking into consideration. And secondly that we can give another interpretation of Sellars that is not vulnerable to some of the problems of which Smith accuses Sellars
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References found in this work BETA
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York, Humanities Press.
Bill Brewer (1999/2002). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
A. D. Smith (2002). The Problem of Perception. Harvard University Press.
Michael Williams (2001). Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. OUP Oxford.
John McDowell (1995). Knowledge and the Internal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):877-93.
Citations of this work BETA
Indrek Reiland (2015). Experience, Seemings, and Evidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.
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