Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem

Social Epistemology 25 (2):173 - 182 (2011)
Abstract
According to the so?called swamping problem, reliabilist knowledge is no more valuable than mere true belief. In a paper called ?Reliabilism and the value of knowledge? (in Epistemic value, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, pp. 19?41. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Alvin I. Goldman and myself proposed, among other things, a solution based on conditional probabilities. This approach, however, is heavily criticized by Jonathan L. Kvanvig in his paper ?The swamping problem redux: Pith and gist? (in Social Epistemology, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, pp. 89?111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). In the present article, I defend the conditional probability solution against Kvanvig?s objections
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References found in this work BETA
Ward E. Jones (1997). ``Why Do We Value Knowledge&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 34:423-440.

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Citations of this work BETA
Erik J. Olsson (2011). The Value of Knowledge. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.
Similar books and articles
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 89-112.
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