David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 159 (2):297 - 314 (2007)
In the late preschool years children acquire a "theory of mind", the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children's ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children's developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability to ascribe intentions to themselves. This is achieved, I argue, when they possess the ability to hold an utterance or rule in mind in the form of a quoted expression, and second, when they grasp the causal relation between the rule and their action. The account of how children learn to ascribe intention to themselves and others will then be used to explore the larger question of the relations amongst language, intentional states and the ascription and avowal of those states.
|Keywords||Ascription Avowal Intention Mental states Obligations Quotation Responsibility Rules Speech acts Self-control|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
James Russell (2007). Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children. Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.
J. Fahlquist & I. van de Poel (2012). Technology and Parental Responsibility: The Case of the V-Chip. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (2):285-300.
Tillmann Vierkant (2005). Owning Intentions and Moral Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):507 - 534.
I. van de Poel (2012). Technology and Parental Responsibility: The Case of the V-Chip. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (2):285-300.
A. Strand (2013). Group Agency, Responsibility, and Control. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):201-224.
Mark Coeckelbergh (2012). Moral Responsibility, Technology, and Experiences of the Tragic: From Kierkegaard to Offshore Engineering. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):35-48.
Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
Deborah Tollefsen (2005). Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
B. Sodian, C. Hulsken & C. Thoermer (2003). The Self and Action in Theory of Mind Research. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):777-782.
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #101,300 of 1,725,464 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #167,283 of 1,725,464 )
How can I increase my downloads?