David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1997)
Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous thought-experiments dealing with personal identity. He argues, instead, that one could survive the destruction of all of one's psychological contents and capabilities as long as the human organism remains alive--as long as its vital functions, such as breathing, circulation, and metabolism, continue
|Keywords||Animal Biology Human Being Life Organism Personal Identity Psychology Science|
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|Buy the book||$7.45 used (86% off) $19.14 new (62% off) $39.34 direct from Amazon (22% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD450.O46 1997|
|ISBN(s)||0195105060 0195134230 9780195134230|
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Citations of this work BETA
Derek Parfit (2012). We Are Not Human Beings. Philosophy 87 (01):5-28.
Jim Stone (2005). Why There Still Are No People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.
Nicholas Agar (2003). Functionalism and Personal Identity. Noûs 37 (1):52-70.
Sydney Shoemaker (2008). Persons, Animals, and Identity. Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2002). Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.
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Jim Stone (2000). Review of Eric Olson: 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology '. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (No. 2):495-497.
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Ned Markosian (2008). Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity. Abstracta 3 (3):16-22.
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