The Value of Knowledge

Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883 (2011)
Abstract
A problem occupying much contemporary epistemology is that of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper provides an overview of this debate, starting with historical figures and early work. The contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology is then surveyed and some recent developments that deserve special attention are highlighted, including mounting doubts about the prospects for virtue epistemology to solve the value problem as well as renewed interest in classical and reliabilist‐externalist responses
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
Guy Axtell (1997). Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1 - 26.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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Erik J. Olsson (2007). Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):343 - 355.
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