What are we?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):37-55 (2007)
Abstract
This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer
Keywords Philosophical anthropology  Self (Philosophy  Ontology
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Call number BD450.O465 2007
ISBN(s) 9780195176421  
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.001.0001
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S. Clint Dowland (2016). Embodied Mind Sparsism. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1853-1872.
Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.

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