David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110 (1997)
The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what does ordinarily happen to a human fetus, if it does not come to be a person. Although an extremely complex variant of the Standard View may allow one to persist without psychological continuity before one becomes a person but not afterwards, a far simpler solution is to accept a radically non-psychological account of our identity
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Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2013). Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.
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Laura Klaming & Pim Haselager (2013). Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence. Neuroethics 6 (3):527-539.
Stephen Wright (2010). The Leibniz's Law Problem (For Stage Theory). Metaphysica 11 (2):137-151.
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