Was jekyll Hyde?

Perhaps we should begin with this question: What is the “problem of free will”? Like those other great “problem” phrases that philosophers bandy about, “the mind-body problem,” “the problem of universals,” and “the problem of evil,” this phrase has no clear referent. There are obviously a lot of philosophical problems about free will, but which of them, or which combination of them, is the problem of free will? I will propose an answer to this question, but this proposal can be no more than just that, a proposal. I propose that we understand the problem of free will to be the following problem
Keywords multiple personality identity
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00264.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press 17-40.

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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Kevin Warwick (2014). Creating Practical Cyborgs. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 22 (1):159-181.

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