Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions

Theoria 25 (2):137-147 (2010)
Abstract
Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden'sview with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account
Keywords Vagueness  Sorites paradox  Supervaluationism  Jamie Tappenden
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