A note about a Quinean argument against direct reference

Philosophia 24 (1-2):157-170 (1994)
In this paper, I argue -- against Steven Wagner -- that Nathan Salmon's semantic theory is not refuted by a suitable variant of Quine's slingshot (Word and Object, 148-9).
Keywords Quine  Salmon  Wagner  slingshot  sustitutivity  direct reference  neo-Fregean  Millian  semantics  pragmatics
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DOI 10.1007/BF02379951
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References found in this work BETA
Nathan Salmon (1986). Reflexivity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (3):401-429.
Steven J. Wagner (1986). California Semantics Meets the Great Fact. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (3):430-455.
Graham Oppy (1992). Why Semantic Innocence? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):445 – 454.

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