Evidential Arguments from Evil and Skeptical Theism
Philo 8 (2):84-94 (2005)
| Abstract | In this paper we respond to criticisms by Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea in their “In Defense of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005) | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesMichael Bergmann & Michael Rea (2005). In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241 – 251.
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